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FORFEITURES IN NARCOTICS CASES: THE
CONSTITUTION AND RECENT AMENDMENTS TO
MARYLAND'S FORFEITURE STATUTE
Douglas Clark Hollmannt
Each year Americans spend almost eighty br1lion dollars on illegal drugs. The government's ability to confiscate property is
perhaps its most poweiful weapon in battling illegal drug trafficking. Amendments to Maryland's foifeiture provision have
recently expanded the categories offoifeitable property. In this
article, the author analyzes the amendments, with an emphasis
on the fourth amendment/imitations on foifeitures. The author
concludes that the seizure ofproperty for foifeiture requires a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, and that
the exclusionary rule provides an ineffective remedy for fourth
amendment violations in the foifeiture context. The author contends that the dismissal of a foifeiture should be the remedy for
illegal seizures offoifeitable property.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Forfeitures in narcotics cases are governed by article 27, section
297 of the Annotated Code ofMaryland. 1 In 1982, the General Assembly significantly amended section 297 to expand the types of property
involved in narcotics violations that can be forfeited to the state. 2 This
expansion will accelerate the already increasing use of this tool by law
enforcement agencies in combating narcotics traffickers. 3 In addition,
attempts to seize and forfeit the new categories of property included in
section 297 will focus attention upon a facet of forfeiture law not often
considered by courts: the relationship between the fourth amendment
and seizures of forfeitable property. This article will discuss the legal
principles that are unique to forfeiture law, the significance of the recent amendments to section 297, and the application of the fourth
amendment to seizures of property subject to forfeiture. 4

t

l.
2.
3.

4.

B.A., 1964, Duke University; LL.B., 1967, Columbia University School of Law;
Partner, Goodman, Cohen & Bennett, P.A., Annapolis, Maryland. The author
formerly served as a trial attorney in the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of
the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, where he dealt extensively with forfeitures. The author wishes to thank Catherine Potthast for her
assistance.
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
See infra notes 66-llO and accompanying text.
In the first year after the adoption by Congress of a similar forfeiture provision,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized $13,000 in assets; in the
second year of operation, DEA seized $94,000,000 in assets. Hearings on S. 83
Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland General Assembly, 1982 Legislative Sess. (testimony of Charles Olender, Chief of Financial Investigation Division, DEA) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 83].
The due process limitations upon the state's right to forfeit property will not be
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The concept of forfeitures was recognized in the Bible 6 and has
been a part of American law since the beginning of the Republic. 7
While this article is limited to a discussion of forfeiture law as it relates
to narcotics cases, certain principles apply to all forfeitures. 8 First, a
forfeiture is a civil action in rem. 9 Second, the seized object is the subject of the suit rather than its owner, and the suit is unrelated to any
criminal proceeding. 10 Third, since a forfeiture is a civil proceeding,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

given extensive treatment in this article. See infra note 208. One due process
issue that may arise in the forfeiture context is whether the owner of seized property is entitled to preseizure notice and hearing. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (preseizure hearing not required). For a
discussion of due process and the forfeiture of automobiles under Maryland's statute, see Comment, Due Process in Automobile Foifeiture Proceedings, 3 U. BALT.
L. REv. 270 (1974). A second issue that arises is whether delay between the time
of seizure and the institution of forfeiture proceedings violates due process. See
United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United
States Currency, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983) (18 month delay did not violate due process); see also Jonesv. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 117-18,466 A.2d 895,903-04 (1983)
(three month delay between state's knowledge of narcotics violation and seizure of
vehicle did not violate due process); see generally Kandaras, Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee A Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 195
(1981) (discussing due process implications of delay); Kandaras, Federal Property
Foifeiture Statutes: The Needfor Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925
( 1980) (discussing due process and delay); see also i'!fra note 197 (cases advocating
dismissal of forfeiture as remedy for due process violations).
A forfeiture is a "deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance of some obligation or condition." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 585
(5th ed. 1979); see 36 AM. JuR. 2o Foifeitures and Penalties § I (1968).
"If an ox gore a man or a woman and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh not
eaten." Exodus 21:28.
See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47 (repealed 1790).
For a recent discussion of these principles that, although made in a gambling case,
reflect the current view of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, see Director of Fin.
v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 465 A.2d 450 (1983).
Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655,284 A.2d 203 (1971).
This article will not discuss the concept of criminal forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture
is an in personam suit against the felon; the forfeiture does not lie unless the felon
is convicted of the underlying crime. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). Although the First Congress specifically rejected this concept, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, I Stat. 117 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)), Congress in 1970 revived this form of forfeiture when it
included criminal forfeiture provisions in two laws. Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, § 90l(a), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 943 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(c) (1982)) (governing racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations
(RICO)); Controlled Substances Act, § 408(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1265-66 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982)) (applies to continuing
criminal enterprise offenses). A bill pending in Congress would expand the availability of criminal forfeitures under the Controlled Substances Act. H.R. 4901,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 104(m) (1984). As this issue went to press, this bill was
incorporated into H.R. 3291, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., and enacted as Pub. L. No. 98573 (1984).
Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 261, 267 (1878); Prince
George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658, 284 A.2d 203, 205
(1971).

1984)

Forfeitures in Narcotics Cases

81

the state's burden is met if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property was used or intended for use in violation of a criminal
statute. 11 This burden is considerably less than that in criminal cases. 12
Fourth, since a forfeiture proceeding is a civil action in rem, it is of
little significance whether there is a criminal conviction. Indeed, the
innocence of the owner of the seized property is not a defense to a
forfeiture action.D Thus, even though a defendant/owner of forfeitable property is acquitted of the criminal charges, the property may nevertheless be forfeited to the state.1 4
Forfeiture laws are derived from the ancient concept of deodand.l 5
Because this concept was never accepted by American courts as part of
the common law, 16 forfeiture in the United States is a creature of statutory law.J7 Federal forfeiture statutes are more extensive than those
found in Maryland. For example, federal provisions allow the forfeiture of property used in connection with narcotics, 18 aliens, 19 firearms,20 liquor violations, 21 customs violations, 22 gambling violations, 23
contraband, 24 and counterfeiting. 25 In Maryland, however, forfeitures
are primarily restricted to property used in connection with narcotics, 26
11. State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 277, 292 A.2d 64, 66 (1972).
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (prosecution must prove guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt).
13. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203,
205 ( 1971 ). The court of appeals has held that a court does not have discretion or
any basis to deny a forfeiture if the state proves the statutory elements. State v.
One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 279, 292 A.2d 64, 66 (1972).
14. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984); see One
Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam);
United States v. 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Bozman v. Office of Fin., 52 Md. App. l, 445 A.2d 1073 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 492,
463 A.2d 832 (1983).
15. A deodand is "any personal chattel whatever, animate or inanimate, which, becoming the immediate instrument by which the death of a human creature was
caused, was forfeited to the king . . . ." Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn.
509,510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916). The concept was abused to provide property for
favorites of the king. Id In 1846, England abolished deodand by statute. 940
Viet. ch. 62 (1846).
16. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
17. United States v. Lane Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495, 496-97 (lOth Cir. 1952), ajf'd, 344
U.S. 630 (1953). But see State v. 158 Gaming Devices, 59 Md. App. 44, 474 A.2d
545, cert. granted, 301 Md. 44 (1984).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a) (1982).
19. 8 u.s.c. § 1324(b) (1982).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 5872(a) (1982).
21. 18 u.s.c. § 3615 (1982).
22. 46 U.S.C. § 325 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1082(c)(3), 1955(d) (1982); see 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1982) (construed to
permit forfeiture, see United States v. 1978 Cadillac El Dorado 2-Door Coupe,
489 F. Supp. 532 (D. Utah 1980)).
24. 49 u.s.c. § 782 (1976).
25. Id
26. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
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gambling or lottery violations,27 alcoholic beverages, 2s and handguns. 29
III.

RECENT AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 297

The recent amendments to section 297 have significantly expanded
the availability of forfeiture in narcotics cases. A discussion of the history of Maryland's forfeiture statutes will illustrate the impact of these
new amendments.
A.

The Law Prior to the 1982 Amendments

In 1951, the General Assembly enacted the first Maryland forfeiture provision dealing with narcotics. 30 The scope of this original attempt to exercise the power to forfeit property was extremely limited,
reaching only vehicles used in connection with violations of the narcotics law. 31 A vehicle could not be forfeited unless the state established
that the person using the vehicle had been convicted of the underlying
crime and that the owner had authorized the illegal use.32
This rather narrow forfeiture provision was superseded in 1970 by
section 297. In 1971, Congress amended the federal provision relating
to forfeitures in narcotics cases. 33 Both the federal and Maryland statutes were modeled on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act34 and
were not only parallel in format but contained identical language in
many places. 35 Because of the similarities between the two statutes, the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id § 264(a) (1982).
ld art. 2C, § 3 (1981).
ld art. 27, § 36C (1982).
1951 Mo. LAWS 471 (current version at Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297 (1982 &
Supp. 1983)).
The 1951 forfeiture provision read as follows:
In addition to any other fines or penalties provided for a violation
of the provisions of this subtitle, any motor vehicle or other vehicle, vessel or aircraft used or employed in the concealment, conveying or transporting of any such narcotic drugs, or used during the course of any
violation of this subtitle by any person or persons convicted of the same,
shall upon the conviction or convictions be declared by the court to be
forfeited to the county or to Baltimore City, as the case may be; provided
that no vehicle shall be forfeited hereunder unless the owner thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment. The county commissioners or the mayor and city council of Baltimore at their discretion may
use the said vehicle for public purposes or may exchange, sell or convey
it to another person or persons; and any cash or moneys received therefor shall be added to the general funds of the county or City of
Baltimore.
1951 MD. LAWS 471 (first codified at Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 301 (1957)) (current version at id § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
These requirements were added during consideration of Senate Bill 406, which
became article 27, section 301 of the 1957 Code.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970) (current version at id (1982)).
UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970).
Compare 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b) (1970) (former federal version) with Mo. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 297(b) (1971) (former Maryland provision).
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construction of the federal statute has been helpful in determining the
meaning of the Maryland statute.36
Section 297, as enacted in 1970, provided for the forfeiture of six
categories of property: (1) controlled dangerous substances ("CDS");
(2) raw materials, products, and equipment; (3) containers; (4) "conveyances" such as vehicles, aircraft, and vessels; (5) books, records, and
research; and (6) currency.3 7 The first five categories, taken from the
36. See Prince George's County v. One 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 (1973)
(relying on federal statute); Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263
Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971) (same).
37. The 1970 version of section 297, as amended through 1981, provided:
(a) Property subject to forfeiture.- The following shall be subject to
forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them:
(l) All controlled dangerous substances which have been manufactured,
distributed, dispensed, acquired, or possessed in violation of the provisions of this subheading;
(2) All raw materials, products and equipment of any kind which are
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled dangerous substance
in violation of the provisions of this subheading;
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraphs (1);
(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in (1) or (2), except that,
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier or vehicle
for hire in the transaction of business as a common carrier or vehicle for
hire shall be seized or forfeited under this subheading unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subheading; and
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to
have been committed or omitted by any person other than such owner
while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person
other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, or of any state;
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used or intended for use, in violation of this
subheading;
(6) All money or currency which shall be found in close proximity to
contraband controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia
or which otherwise has been used or intended for use in connection with
the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia.
This money or currency shall be deemed to be contraband of law
and all rights, title and interest in and to the money or currency shall
immediately vest in and to Baltimore City or the county in which it was
seized, the municipal corporation, if seized by municipal authorities, or,
if it was seized by State authorities, the State; and no such money or
currency shall be returned to any person claiming it, or to any other
person, except in the manner hereinafter provided and;
(7) All drug paraphernalia as prohibited by § 287 A of this article, and
controlled paraphernalia as prohibited by § 287 of this article.
Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297(a) (1982) (amended version at id (Supp. 1983)).
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Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 38 have been the subject of much
litigation, particularly the category dealing with conveyances. 39 This
litigation has resulted because conveyances are by far the largest class
of objects seized and because it is easy to claim that an automobile,
boat, or airplane, unlike contraband per se, 40 has been seized unjustly.
As a result of this litigation, detailed provisions relating to the forfeiture of motor vehicles have been included in the Maryland statute. 41
38. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970). The first five categories have also been adopted in substantial part by Congress in its forfeiture enactment, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), and by at least 46 states and the District of
Columbia. ALA. CODE§ 20-2-93 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.110 (1983); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-106 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2629 (Supp.
1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 11470-11472 (West 1975 & Supp. 1983);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 2la-246(d) (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784
(1975 & Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-552 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE§ 16-13-32 (1983);
HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 329-55 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE§ 37-2744 (1977 & Supp.
1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 l/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1983); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-8.5 to -8.51 (Bums 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.505 (West
Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135 (1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 218A.270 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1550 (West Supp. 1984);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2387 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 297
(1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 47 (West 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.19 (West
Supp. 1984); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-29-153 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 195.140, 195.145 (Vernon 1983); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 44-12-102 (1983); NEB.
REv. STAT.§ 28-431 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 453.301 (1972); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 318B:l7b (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C-64-l (West 1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN.§ 30-31-34 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 3387 (McKinney
1977 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 90-112 (1976 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE§ 19-03.1-36 (1981 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503 (West
1973 & Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-128 (Purdon 1977 & Supp.
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 21-28-5.04 to -5.05 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 4453-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 34-20B-70
(1977 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 53-11-409 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 5837-13 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-249 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69.50.505 (1970 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 60A-5-505 (1977); WIS. STAT.
ANN.§ 161.55 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT.§ 35-7-1049 (1977 & Supp.
1983). Several other jurisdictions retain forfeiture provisions patterned after the
older Uniform Narcotics Drug Act. CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 18-17-106 (Supp. 1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2925.13 (Page 1982); OR. REV. STAT.§ 167.247 (1981);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4219, 4227 (1982).
39. E.g., United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, 604 F.2d 27 (8th
Cir. 1979); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H.
1974).
40. Contraband per se is property that is inherently illegal to possess. Director of Fin.
v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 619, 465 A.2d 450, 457 (1983). In contrast, derivative contraband is property that is legal to possess, but which is subject to forfeiture if
used illegally or if it is connected with illegal activity. /d. Conveyances are in the
second category.
41. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1983) (exemptions for common carriers and stolen vehicles); id. § 297(f) (procedures for forfeiture). See gen-
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Failure of the authorities to comply with these provisions may result in
the defeat of the forfeiture action. 42
The sixth category, subsection 297(a)(6), dealt with the forfeiture
of currency. This unique provision contained two separate bases for
the forfeiture of currency. The first part of the subsection focused on
the "proximity" of the currency to CDS, and permitted the forfeiture of
"all money or currency which shall be found in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia . . . ." 43 The second part of the subsection allowed for the
forfeiture of currency that was "connected" with drug activity: "or
which otherwise has been used or intended for use in connection with
the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphemalia."44
The question raised by this provision is whether the language requiring proximity is modified by the language requiring a connection
with a CDS violation. If so, currency found in close proximity to CDS
would need more than mere proximity to the contraband to be forfeitable. If not, mere proximity would appear to be enough. More traditional bases for forfeiture rely upon some association beyond mere
proximity to support a forfeiture action. 45 Despite the statutory ambiguity, the Maryland cases that have considered the concept of "close
proximity" have not attempted to resolve the issue.
In Gatewood v. State, 46 police seized a paper bag containing cash,
heroin, and marijuana from the defendant. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland dismissed the defendant's objection to the forfeiture with the
following language:
The proximity point requires little discussion. The uncontroverted testimony was that the cash, the heroin and the mari-

42.

43.

44.
45.

46.

erally Comment, supra note 4 (discussing procedures for forfeiting automobiles in
Maryland).
E.g., State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, 57 Md. App. 178, 469 A.2d
487 (1984); State v. One 1979 Pontiac Firebird, 55 Md. App. 394, 462 A.2d 73
(1983); see Prince George's County v. One 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168
(1973).
Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297 (a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983))
(emphasis supplied). At least five other states and the District of Columbia have
enacted provisions that appear to permit the forfeiture of currency found in close
proximity to CDS. See ALA. ConE§ 20-2-93 (1975); D.C. ConE ANN. § 33-552
(Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE§ 37-2744 (1977 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56
l/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 218A.270
(Baldwin 1982); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983).
Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983))
(emphasis supplied).
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 297(a)(l)-(5) (Supp. 1983) (categories of forfeitable
property require some type of illegal use prior to forfeiture); cf Bozman v. Office
of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 510, 463 A.2d 832, 842 (1983) (Eldridge, J., dissenting)
(money is not contraband per se; whether it is contraband depends upon its connection with CDS).
268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973).
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juana were in the same brown paper bag. The fact that the
cash happened to be in a bank money sack which was also in
the paper bag can scarcely be said to negate the concept of
proximity, and the lower court so found. 47
In the recent case of Bozman v. Office of Finance ,48 the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland upheld the forfeiture of currency discovered in the same room as the contraband. The Bozman court declined
to define close proximity, remarking that: "[w]e liken 'close proximity'
to Justice Stewart's comment on pornography. We do not define it, but
we know it when we see it."49 The court of appeals affirmed the decision, and only briefly discussed close proximity. 50 The court found that
these two words "have relative rather than precise definitions. Thus,
the interpretation of both depends upon the facts and circumstances
existing in connection with their application." 51 Since there was no explanation for the presence of the drugs and the money in the same
room, the court of appeals upheld the trial judge's determination that
the drugs and money were in close proximity. 52
The second part of the currency provision, which provided for the
forfeiture of money used "in connection with" drug activity, 53 has
rarely been used by Maryland law enforcement authorities. Each of
the three Maryland decisions discussing the currency provisions of subsection (6) deals with currency found in close proximity to CDS. 5 4 The
failure of narcotics agents to seize and forfeit currency used in connection with CDS violations may be attributable to their traditionally deficient skills in the handling of financial investigations. 5 5 Until recently
47. Id at 353-54, 301 A.2d at 500-01; see also Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 245, 310
A.2d 768,771 (1973) (question of whether more than mere proximity was required
to forfeit currency was raised but not discussed).
48. 52 Md. App. 1, 445 A.2d 1073 (1982), ajf'd, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983).
49. Bozman, 52 Md. App. at 4-5, 445 A.2d at 1073-75 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
50. Bozman, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983), ajf'g 52 Md. App. 1, 445 A.2d 1073
(1982).
51. /d. at 501, 463 A.2d at 837.
52. Id
53. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1971) (current version at id (Supp. 1983)).
54. Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 310 A.2d 768 (1973); Gatewood v. State, 268 Md.
349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973); Bozman v. Office of Fin., 52 Md. App. l, 445 A.2d 1073
(1982), ajf'd, 296 Md. 492, 463 A.2d 832 (1983). It is doubtful, however, that the
number of reported cases on forfeitures accurately reflects the actual number of
forfeitures. Unlike criminal prosecutions, which are difficult for a defendant to
avoid, forfeiture proceedings can be ignored with impunity since the only penalty
for failing to contest the action is the forfeiture of the property itself. A challenge
to the forfeiture requires an explanation of where the property came from and
who was using it. This information is admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution or tax proceeding. Many forfeitures are uncontested and it may be that the
property owners choose to disavow any connection, legal or otherwise, rather than
risk closer examination by law enforcement authorities.
55. The DEA began financial investigation training for its agents and supervisors in
1979. A course is now offered in the history of banking, the Federal Reserve
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the investigator's drive to seize drugs obscured other ways of combating
narcotics traffickers. 56
Under the 1970 Maryland act, money and currency were the only
types of forfeitable financial property.57 Other financial assets such as
negotiable instruments or precious metals were not covered, even if
there was a connection with a narcotics violation. It should be recognized, however, that the 1970 Maryland provision allowing the seizure
of money and currency was broader than the forfeiture laws enacted in
most other jurisdictions. 58 The Uniform Controlled Substances Act 59
and the federal forfeiture statute, 60 as well as the law in nearly every
other state, provided only for the forfeiture of property that fit into one
of the five specified categories. 61 Money and currency were not included in those categories. Since the state's right to forfeit property
depends upon statutory law, 62 forfeitable property must be enumerated
in a specific statutory provision. In those states lacking a "currency"
category, money as well as the proceeds of CDS transactions, negotiable instruments, and stocks and bonds are not forfeitable. For example, a raid on a drug operation could result in the seizure and forfeiture
of CDS, the laboratory equipment, the records used by the organization, containers for CDS, and any vehicles used in the operation. Except in Maryland and a few other states, 63 piles of cash on the same

56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

System, the Financial Privacy and Bank Secrecy Act, net worth and concealment
income analysis, as well as the review of forfeiture statutes. See CoMPTROLLER
GENERAL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM
USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING I (1981). According to the
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission, while no comparable
training seminars are held for Maryland law enforcement officers at the present
time, one is being prepared. Telephone interview with Carl Bart, Staff Member of
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission (May 4, 1984).
Meyers, Dealers, Dollars and Drugs, 9 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 7 (Summer 1972);
Comment, Criminal Foifeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized
Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 227 (1982).
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (1982) (current version at id. (Supp. 1983)).
Forfeiture laws of other jurisdictions that allowed for the forfeiture of money and
currency, see supra note 43 & infra note 63 (listing current versions), were preceded by the 1970 Maryland enactment. The comparable federal provision was
not enacted until 1978. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, § 301, Pub. L. No.
95-633, 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1982)).
UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1970).
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1970) (current version at id. (1982)).
The five categories are: CDS; raw materials, products and equipment; containers;
conveyances; and books, records, and research. See supra note 38 (listing current
versions of state forfeiture provisions).
Absent a statute, there is no common law right of forfeiture. Parker-Harris Co. v.
Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916); see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
Idaho and Illinois statutory law would seem to allow seizures of currency without
requiring any showing other than proximity. IDAHO CoDE § 37-2744 (1977 &
Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd 1976 & Supp.
1983). A number of other states permit seizures of currency if there is a connection with CDS activity beyond proximity. ALA. CoDE§ 20-2-93 (1975); ALASKA
STAT.§ 17.30.110 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-106 (Supp. 1983); ARK.
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table with the equipment and the CDS could not be seized and
forfeited.
As drug trafficking increased during the 1970's, law enforcement
authorities began to realize that they could not seize many assets connected with narcotics violations under existing statutes. The result has
been a flurry of recent amendments to federal and state forfeiture
laws. 64 In 1978 Congress amended the federal statute to permit the
seizure and forfeiture of a wide range of financial assets connected with
CDS activity. 65 Four years later, Maryland followed suit when the
1982 General Assembly enacted a substantially similar provision.
B.

The 1982 Amendments
The 1982 amendments to section 297 revised the currency category
in subsection (6). The amendments added a new subsection (8) that
greatly expanded the types of property that can be forfeited. 66 To understand fully the range of assets now subject to forfeiture in narcotics
cases, subsections (6) and (8) must be read together. 67

64.

65.

66.

67.

STAT. ANN.§ 82-2629 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West
1976 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1982); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 218A.270 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1550 (West Supp.
1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2387 (Supp. 1983); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 94C, § 47 (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 152.19 (West Supp. 1984); Miss.
CODE ANN.§ 41-29-153 (Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 318B:l7b (1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-64-l (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34 (Supp.
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Co-op. 1962 & Supp. 1983); TENN.
CoDE ANN.§ 53-11-409 (1983); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.03
(Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1983); VA. CoDE § 18.2-249 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.55 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983).
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 893.12, 932.70l(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1982). See generally supra note 38 (listing statutes).
Indeed, a bill is now pending in the House of Representatives that would further
expand the categories of forfeitable property to include land and buildings used to
store CDS. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 102(a) (1984) (proposed Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984). See supra note 9.
As amended in 1978, the federal statute provided:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978) (current version at id (1982)).
See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6), (8) (Supp. 1983). The General Assembly
enacted subsection (7) in 1980 to provide for the forfeiture of drug paraphernalia.
This category of property, which relates more to a possessory offense than to a
trafficking violation, will not be discussed in this article.
Introduced as Senate Bill 83, this amendment became 1982 Mo. LAWS 472 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6), (8) (Supp. 1983)). The General Assembly amended subsection (6) to provide for the forfeiture of:
All money, coin, or currency which has been used or intended for use in
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Subsection (6): Money, Coin, or Currency

Subsection (6) of section 297(a), dealing with the forfeiture of
money and currency, has been amended more in style than in substance. "Money or currency" is now "money, coin, or currency." 68 The
language providing for the forfeiture of money or currency "used or
intended for use" in violation of the CDS laws has been moved so that
the emphasis of the subsection is now clearly on the connection with
CDS activity, rather than the proximity of the money to CDS. 69
Despite the statute's shift in emphasis, the physical proximity of
money to CDS continues to be relevant under the amended statute.
The amendments to subsection (6) create a rebuttable presumption that
money, coin, or currency found in close proximity to CDS and other
forfeitable property is forfeitable. 70 This presumption is necessary in
light of the difficulty of proving a connection, absent other evidence,
with CDS activity. Although there are constitutional constraints on the
use of presumptions in criminal proceedings, 71 the rebuttable presumption of section 297 is unaffected since a forfeiture is a civil action in
rem.
An example posited in a dissent by Judge Eldridge serves to illustrate the impact of the amendments to subsection (6). Prior to the 1982
amendments, the close proximity rule of subsection (6) would have allowed the forfeiture of "the entire contents of a bank vault . . . if one
safe deposit box were found to contain controlled dangerous substances
connection with the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia.
All money, coin, or currency which is found in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances, controlled paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled dangerous substances are presumed to be forfeitable under
this paragraph. The burden of proof is upon a claimant of the property
to rebut this presumption.
This money or currency shall be deemed to be contraband of law
and all rights, title and interest in and to the money or currency shall
immediately vest in and to Baltimore City or the county in which it was
seized, the municipal corporation, if seized by municipal authorities, or,
if it was seized by State authorities, the State; and no such money or
currency shall be returned to any person claiming it, or to any other
person, except in the manner hereinafter provided.
ld § 297(a)(6). The new subsection (8) provides for the forfeiture of:
Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange
for a controlled dangerous substance in violation of this subheading, all
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all negotiable instruments
and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of
this subheading.
ld § 297(a)(8).
68. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis supplied). For the
text of this provision, see supra note 67.
69. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983).
70./d
71. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 422 U.S. 140, 157-63 (1979).
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[B]ecause the surrounding boxes would be in 'close proximity' to
the drug containing box, all the money or currency contained within
them would be subject to forfeiture." 72 The 1982 amendments to subsection (6) permit owners of the safe deposit boxes to come forward
and rebut the presumption that the contents of these boxes had a connection with the CDS violations.
The amended subsection (6) subjects money, coin, and currency to
forfeiture if it has been used or intended for use "in connection with" a
violation of the CDS laws. 73 In contrast, subsection (8) of section
297(a) provides for the forfeiture of negotiable instruments and securities that "facilitate" CDS violations. 74 This use of two similar but different terms in one statute implies that, arguably at least, a situation
may exist where money, coin, or currency has some "connection" with
a violation of CDS laws but does not "facilitate" the violation. 75 The
federal forfeiture statute subjects vehicles to forfeiture if they "facilitate" a CDS transaction. 76 Not every situation involving a vehicle,
72. Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 511 n.4, 463 A.2d 832, 842 n.4 ( 1983)
(Eldridge & Davidson, JJ., dissenting).
73. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983).
74. Id § 297(a)(8).
75. The dichotomy of the language is probably the result of an attempt to engraft
provisions of the DEA's model forfeiture provision onto the existing Maryland
statute. Because of the success with the 1978 amendment to the federal forfeiture
provision, the DEA has been supporting similar amendments to state statutes.
The 1982 amendment to section 297 was in part a result of these efforts. The DEA
model forfeiture act provides:
Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this Act (meaning the Controlled Substances Act of this State), all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used,
or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of this Act; except that
no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by him
to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent.
Rebullable Presumption: All moneys, coin, and currency found in close
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, to forfeitable drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the
importation, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances, are
presumed to be forfeitable under this paragraph. The burden of proof is
upon claimants of property to rebut this presumption.
MODEL FORFEITURE OF DRUG PROFITS AcT (DEA, United States Dep't of Justice 1981) (emphasis supplied) (copy of act with drafters' comments available at
the University of Baltimore Law Review).
76. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) (1982). Several courts have adopted a test requiring the
facilitation to have a "substantial" or "significant" connection with the CDS violation. Eg., United States v. One (l) Liberian Refrigerator Vessel, 447 F. Supp.
1053, 1060 (M.D. Fla. 1977), ajf'd sub nom. EA Shipping Co. v. Bazemore, 617
F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200,
1205 (D.N.H. 1974); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe, 364 F. Supp. 745,
747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In United States v. One 1968 Ford LTD 4 Door, 425 F.2d
1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit applied an "active aid" test and upheld the forfeiture of an automobile that was driven in the company of a second
vehicle containing untaxed liquor.
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however, results in a determination that the use "facilitated" the CDS
violation. Thus, using a vehicle to commute to the scene of the transaction is usually not considered a significant enough connection to facilitate the transaction, 77 although some courts have reached an opposite
conclusion. 78 In this regard, money, coin, and currency may be distinguishable from automobiles; it is difficult to conceive of a situation
where money with any connection to a CDS violation would not facilitate the violation as well. As a result, concern over this difference in
terminology in subsections 297(a)(6) and (a)(8) may thus be of only
academic interest.
Subsection (6) provides that money, coin, and currency seized for
forfeiture can only be returned to a claimant in accordance with the
statutory procedures of section 297. 79 The statute requires that the seizing authority institute a forfeiture proceeding against the seized money,
coin, or currency within ninety days from the date of final disposition
of the underlying criminal proceeding. 80 If the forfeiture is not instituted within this time period, the defendant may petition for return of
the money, coin, or currency,s 1 and is entitled to its return. 82 The statutory provisions prevent a claimant from instituting an action in replevin to recover the seized property. 83
Subsection (6) also provides that title to seized money, coin, or
currency vests "immediately" in the seizing authority. 84 The statute
does not, however, specify whether immediately refers to the time of
the violation, the seizure, or the institution of forfeiture proceedings.
Analogous Maryland provisions allowing forfeiture of currency used in
77. United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 575 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1978); Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1970) (decided under previous narcotics forfeiture statute); United States v. Lane Motor Co., 199 F.2d 495 (lOth
Cir. 1952) (tax forfeiture), affd, 344 U.S. 630 (1953); United States v. One Ford
Coach, 1949 Model, 184 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1950) (tax forfeiture); Platt v. United
States, 163 F.2d 165 (lOth Cir. 1947) (decided under previous narcotics forfeiture
statute); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974) (narcotics forfeiture); United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458 (N.D.
Cal. 1953) (decided under previous narcotics forfeiture statute).
78. United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1981)
(forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) permitted when automobile used to transport drug dealer to site of transaction); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (forfeiture under § 88l(a)(4) decreed
when vehicle instrumental in transporting conspirators to location of conspiracy).
79. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
80. Jd § 297(b)(2) (Supp. 1983); see also Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 463
A.2d 832 (1983) (when no criminal proceeding is commenced, 90 day limit does
not apply).
81. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 297(b)(3) (Supp. 1983). The petition must be filed
within one year of the disposition of the criminal proceeding. /d
82. Office of Fin. v. Jones, 46 Md. App. 419, 417 A.2d 470, cert. denied, 288 Md. 740
(1980).
83. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(c) (1982).
84. Jd § 297(a)(6) (Supp. 1983).
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violation of gambling laws 85 suggest that the state's title to money, coin,
or currency connected with narcotics activity vests immediately upon
seizure of the property. The gambling provision contains language
identical to that in subsection (6). 86 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has concluded that the language in the gambling forfeiture statute that
title to seized money "shall vest immediately" in the seizing authority
refers to the moment that the money is seized, and not to the time the
money is used in violation of law or at the time of judgment in the
forfeiture proceeding. 87 Because the forfeiture provisions of subsection
(6) and the gambling provision govern the seizure of currency and
money, and because the provisions contain identical language, subsection (6) should be construed to vest the title in the seizing authority
upon seizure of the money, coin, or currency. 8 8
The time at which the government's title vests is significant in determining the rights of transferees of property. Most federal courts
have concluded that the government's title to forfeitable property vests
at the time the property is used in violation of law, and not at the time
of seizure or the time of judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding. 89
85. /d. § 264 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
86. /d. § 264(a). The gambling provision states in pertinent part:
Whenever any money, currency, or cash is seized or captured by any
police officer in this State in connection with any arrest for the playing or
operation of any bookmaking, betting and wagering on horses or athletic
events, or any lottery, game, table, or gaming device unlawful under the
provisions of this article, all such money, currency, or cash shall be
deemed prima facie to be contraband of law as a gambling device or as a
part of a gambling operation. All rights, title, and interest in and to such
money, currency, or cash seized by the police tifthe local government shall
immediately vest in and to the local governments o/ the county, municipality, or Baltimore City, or !f seized by State authorities, to the State, and no
such money, currency, or cash shall he returned to any person claiming the
same, or to any other person, except as provided in this section. The Baltimore City police department is not a State authority for the purposes of
this section.
/d. (emphasis supplied).
87. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently explained:
Because it is within the power of the legislature to determine when the
transfer of rights to seized goods takes place, . . . the Maryland legislature has fixed the point at the moment the seizure occurs. At this time
the money is prima facie contraband and belongs to the jurisdiction
whose authorities consummate the seizure.
Director of Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 623, 465 A.2d 450, 459 (1983).
88. q: Bozman v. Office of Fin., 296 Md. 492, 505-06, 463 A.2d 832, 839 (1983) (Eldridge, J. dissenting) (reviewing legislative history of subsection (6)); Jones v.
State, 56 Md. App. 101, 116, 466 A.2d 895, 903 (1983) ("Maryland's forfeiture
statute does not permit the federal concept of 'automatic forfeiture' upon illegal
activity.").
89. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. I, 16-17 (1890); Thacher's Distilled Spirits, 103
U.S. 679 (1880); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362 (1842); United
States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982); Simons v. United States, 541
F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. O'Reilly, 486 F.2d 208, 210 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1973); see Ca1ero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685 (1974) (recognizing rule).
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For example, under this "automatic forfeiture" rule, a vehicle used to
transport drugs is technically the property of the state from the moment
of its illegal use. The forfeiture proceeding merely perfects the government's interest in the property. The automatic forfeiture rule can defeat the title of subsequent purchasers of the property since the original
owner, deprived of legal title by his unlawful conduct, cannot convey
good title. 90 The automatic forfeiture rule, however, should not be applied to the forfeiture of money, coin, or currency, since there is a
strong interest in the free transferability of legal tender.
In sum, both the nature of the property covered by subsection (6)
and the similarity of the subsection with the gambling forfeiture provision suggest that the seizing authority's title to seized money, coin, or
currency vests at the time it is seized.
2.

Subsection (8): Everything of Value, Proceeds, Negotiable
Instruments, and Securities

The 1982 amendments to section 297(a) added a new subsection
(8) that includes three additional categories of forfeitable property: (1)
everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange
for CDS; (2) all proceeds traceable to the exchange; and (3) negotiable
instruments and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any
violation of section 297. 91
a.

Everything of Value

In the vast majority of drug transactions, controlled dangerous
substances are exchanged for money. The "everything of value" provision covers not only money but anything else given in exchange. 92
Thus, a boat given in exchange for CDS can now be seized and forfeited although it was never used to convey or facilitate the conveyance
of CDS. In addition, anything "intended" to be furnished in exchange
for CDS is subject to forfeiture. This provision is necessary because
many transactions are interrupted by police action before the exchange
actually takes place. Thus, while it may be more difficult to prove that
property was intended to be furnished in exchange when no such exchange occurs, if the evidence establishes such an intention the property can be forfeited.
90. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
91. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). For the text of this provision,
see supra note 67. Several jurisdictions have recently adopted provisions similar
to subsection 297(a)(8). D.C. CooE § 33-552 (Supp. 1983); HAWAll REv. STAT.
§ 329-55 (Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1550 (West Supp. 1984); MONT.
CoDE ANN.§ 44-12-102 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 58-37-13 (Supp. 1983); WYO.
STAT. § 35-7-1049 (Supp. 1983).
92. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). Subsection (8) would cover, for
example, precious metals such as gold, if it had been given in exchange for CDS.
If the seller purchased the gold with the proceeds of a CDS transaction, the gold
would be forfeitable proceeds.

94
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Proceeds

The new subsection (8) provides that proceeds traceable to an exchange of CDS are forfeitable. 9 3 While not defined in section 297, proceeds is a commonly used legal term meaning the status that attaches to
any property that is substituted for what was originally exchanged. 94
For example, if a seller transfers CDS to a buyer in exchange for
$100,000 in currency, the currency represents the proceeds of the CDS
transaction. If the seller deposits the $100,000 in a bank account,
$100,000 of his account becomes proceeds. If he withdraws $40,000
and purchases an automobile, the automobile as well as the remaining
$60,000 in the account are proceeds. Of course, the further the proceeds are removed from the CDS transaction, the more difficult it becomes to show that they are proceeds from the transaction.
There is virtually no guidance in existing decisional law for determining what constitutes the proceeds traceable to an exchange of
CDS. 95 Reference to analogous areas of law may provide guidance,
however, in tracing the proceeds of a narcotics transaction. The object
of both the federal and Maryland drug forfeiture statutes is to allow
seizure and forfeiture of both profits and assets of CDS trafficking, and
to assure that the owner does not profit from the narcotics offense. 96
The law of restitution serves a similar object: to attempt to make a
wrongdoer forfeit everything gained from his wrongful activities. 97
Since the same principles that apply to the forfeiture of proceeds of a
CDS transaction apply to restitution, the Restatement of Restitution
may serve as a useful guide in this area. 9 s
The law of restitution clearly establishes that profits earned on
93. Id.
94. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (5th ed. 1979).
95. United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981),
one of the few decisions construing the proceeds provisions of 21 U .S.C. § 881, is
not technically a proceeds case. While there can be little doubt that the cash
found in the apartment in that case was the proceeds of narcotics activity, this was
not an instance where money given in exchange for CDS was traced through bank
accounts and other property such as automobiles and real estate. Rather, the
presence of small amounts of CDS, and the nationality and financial condition of
the persons in possession was sufficient, in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, to show a
substantial connection with CDS activity.
96. While there is no record, as there is in Congress, of the legislative intent of the
Maryland General Assembly that passed Senate Bill 83, the legislative history file
contains numerous references suggesting that the purpose of S. 83 is to attack the
profits of drug trafficking. Hearings on S. 83, supra note 3 (testimony of Harry L.
Meyers, Assistant Chief Counsel, DEA, Jan. 26, 1982). As to the federal provision, Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) stated in sponsoring the amendment to 21
U.S.C. § 881 that later became subsection 88l(a)(6): "The amendment that I am
offering today would provide the United States with strong new weapons to . . .
strike at the profits of illegal drug trafficking." 124 CoNG. REc. 17644 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Culver).
97. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215 (1937).
98. Id. § 295; see Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
1087 (1968).

1984)

Forfeitures in Narcotics Cases

95

proceeds are also proceeds. 99 Restitution law also supplies guidance in
determining the rights of transferees of the proceeds. If the trafficker
uses his proceeds to satisfy a lawful debt, the proceeds should not be
seizable when possessed by the transferees. 100 If an asset that is proceeds is collateral for a debt, such as a residential mortgage, law enforcement authorities can proceed against the asset. In non-debt
situations, ifthe transferee is a bona fide purchaser for value, law enforcement authorities should be estopped from forfeiting the proceeds
in the possession of the bona fide purchaser.I0 1 Indeed, subsection (8)
gives an owner of property or proceeds an opportunity to prevent forfeiture by establishing that the basis for the forfeiture occurred without
the owner's knowledge or consent. 10 2 The justification for this rationale is clear: the purpose of tracing proceeds is to punish the trafficker,
not an innocent third party. 103
In addition to profits, assets acquired by the trafficker in exchange
for proceeds become proceeds themselves and are subject to forfeiture.
The proceeds, however, must be traced to specific assets. 104 In a forfeiture case, unlike a tax proceeding, 105 it is not sufficient to show that the
trafficker has assets, the source of which cannot be identified. For proceeds of CDS transactions to be forfeited, the government must identify the specific assets from which the proceeds are derived. 106 Thus, if
the trail disappears, the right of forfeiture disappears with it.
c.

Negotiable Instruments and Securities

The last part of subsection (8) provides for the forfeiture of "all
negotiable instruments and securities used, or intended to be used, to
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 205 (1937).
See id. § 207.
See id. § 172.
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983).
The federal rule providing for automatic forfeiture at the time of the violation
would, in some circumstances, penalize a bona fide purchaser who obtained the
property before the conclusion of the forfeiture. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing automatic forfeiture). A statute providing that title
vests in the government at the time of seizure, however, would tend to protect the
interests of the bona fide purchaser. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text
(discussing Maryland provision).
104. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 215 (1937).
105. See United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v. Grasso, 629
F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
106. The forfeiture statutes require that the government prove that the proceeds are
traceable to a CDS exchange. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1982); Mo. ANN. ConE
art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983). In a criminal net worth tax prosecution, the
government must show only an increase in net worth and either a "likely source"
or the negation of all nontaxable sources of income. United States v. Grasso, 629
F.2d 805, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The tracing required for the forfeiture of proceeds of CDS violations accords with the law governing identification
of trust property or the proceeds thereof. See Levin v. Security Fin. Ins. Corp.,
246 Md. 712, 230 A.2d 93 (1967).
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facilitate any violation of this subheading." 107 This provision differs
from the first two provisions in subsection (8) because it focuses on
property used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the
CDS laws. In contrast, the first two provisions ("everything of value"
and "proceeds") are limited to transactions or sales. Forfeiture of these
categories requires proof that the property was furnished or was intended to be furnished in exchange for CDS. 108 The negotiable instruments provision is therefore broader since any negotiable instrument or
security used to facilitate any violation of the CDS laws can be forfeited. The word "facilitate" has been extensively discussed in many
federal cases dealing with the forfeiture of conveyances and has been
interpreted as having the ordinary dictionary meaning of making easier
or less difficult. 109
Nearly every use of negotiable instruments and securities by a
drug trafficking organization facilitates the purpose of the organization,
which is to sell drugs and realize profit. In contrast to the treatment of
"money, coin, or currency" in subsection (6), the mere proximity of
negotiable instruments and securities to CDS will not raise a presumption that the property is forfeitable. For example, if during a drug raid
stocks and bonds are found lying on a table next to CDS and drug
paraphernalia, probable cause to believe they have been used to facilitate a CDS violation must be shown before they can be seized and
forfeited. 110
IV.

SEIZURE OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE
UNDER ARTICLE 27, SECTION 297

The purpose of the discussion above was to review the recent
changes to section 297. Although the 1982 amendments added several
new categories of forfeitable property, the amendments did not affect
many of the categories of property which could already be forfeited.
Accordingly, the discussion below will first discuss the categories of
property forfeitable under section 297, as well as the procedures for
seizing each type of property. After reviewing the fourth amendment
limitations upon forfeiture, this analysis concludes that compliance
107. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (Supp. 1983).
108. Id
109. Compare, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (lith Cir.
1983) (vehicle facilitated CDS violation) and United States v. One 1974 Cadillac
Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (same) with United States v. One
1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (lst Cir. 1980) (use of the conveyance did
not facilitate CDS violation) and Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th
Cir. 1970) (use of property did not facilitate CDS violation). See 21 U.S.C.
§ 88l(a)(4) (1982) (facilitation as a basis for forfeiture of conveyances); BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 531 (5th ed. 1979) (defining facilitate).
110. In addition, probable cause is necessary for a seizure alone. See infra text at notes
205-36 (discussing subsection (b) of section 297). It is doubtful, however, whether
any law enforcement officer would fail to seize stocks found next to CDS and drug
paraphernalia in the middle of a laboratory.
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with the fourth amendment requires the issuance of a seizure warrant
prior to the seizure of certain types of forfeitable property. Following
this discussion is an analysis of the remedy for fourth amendment violations when illegal forfeiture seizures occur. An examination of the
exclusionary rule will show that although it may provide an effective
remedy when illegally seized property is sought to be introduced in the
criminal trial of the property owner, the rule's application to a forfeiture proceeding does not protect the owner of illegally seized property.
The analysis concludes that the only effective remedy for an illegal
seizure of property for forfeiture is the dismissal of the forfeiture
action.
A.

Types

of Property Subject to Foifeiture

Since a forfeiture action is a civil proceeding in rem, the property
must be seized and brought within the jurisdiction of the court before
the forfeiture process can begin. 111 Property seizable under the Maryland provision falls into three categories: (1) movable property, such as
conveyances; (2) immovable property, such as real estate; and (3) intangible property, such as bank accounts. Movable property must be
seized to create jurisdiction; 112 the owner of immovable property must
be served with legal documents to create jurisdiction; intangible property must be attached. 113
Although property forfeitable under section 297 can be placed in
one of these three categories, the forfeiture provision does not use these
categories. Rather, the eight categories of property that can be forfeited under subsection 297(a) are: (1) CDS; (2) raw materials, products, and equipment; (3) containers; (4) conveyances; (5) books,
records, and research; (6) money, coin, or currency; (7) drug paraphernalia; and (8) everything of value, proceeds, negotiable instruments,
and securities. 114
Several categories of property rarely become the subject of litigation and thus warrant only brief mention. Seizures of CDS have not
been the subject of litigation in forfeiture cases. 115 Schedule I ConIll. The Brig Ann, l3 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 291 (1815); Prince George's County v. Blue
Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203, 205 (1971).
112. See infra text at notes 205-36 (discussing fourth amendment and the procedure
under section 297 for seizing property).
113. Stocks and bonds can be considered movable property if they are documents that
embody the obligation. Cf. Mo. CoMM. LAw CoDE ANN.§§ 8-101 to -406 (1975)
(governing investment securities). If these documents do not exist, however, the
representation of the obligation, such as a bank account, must be frozen.
114. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a) (Supp. 1983).
115. A claimant will object if the property is also going to be used as evidence in a
criminal proceeding, but he will make the objection during the criminal proceeding, not in the civil forfeiture proceeding. Cases that consider the basis for a
seizure for forfeiture must be carefully segregated into two categories: (I) those in
which the defendant challenges the evidence in a criminal case on the ground that
it was discovered as a result of an illegal seizure for forfeiture; and (2) those in
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trolled Dangerous Substances 11 6 are summarily forfeited to the state
under subsection 297(e). 117 Although this provision does not explain
what the seizing authority must show to forfeit Schedule I CDS, 118 no
formal procedure is required since Schedule I lists those drugs for
which there is no legitimate use and therefore no legal basis for
possession. 119
Similarly, few challenges are made to seizure of three other types
of property in subsection 297(a): raw materials, products, and equipment,120 containers, 121 and books, records, and research. 122 Drug entrepreneurs are understandably hesitant to raise questions in civil
forfeiture proceedings over the seizure of their laboratories and business records. 123 In addition, the seizure of immovables and intangibles
such as real estate and bank accounts deserve little comment since the
procedures for attaching these assets are well established. 124
Challenges to the seizure of forfeitable property will occur most
frequently in cases involving the seizure of conveyances, 125 the seizure
of money, coin, or currency, 126 and the seizure of property forfeitable
under subsection (a)(8). 127 When this property is located in an area in
which its owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement agents must obtain a search warrant to search for and seize the
property. 128 When the property is not located in an area in which the

116.
117.

118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

which the claimant contests the forfeiture action on the ground that the seizure
was illegal. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 279(a) (1982 & Supp. 1983). Among the drugs listed in
Schedule I are heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and marijuana.
Subsection 297(e) provides:
(e) Seizure and summary foifeiture o/ contraband. All substances listed
in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, sold or offered for sale in
violation of the provisions of this subheading shall be deemed contraband and seized and summarily forfeited to the State. Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I, which are seized or come into possession of
the State, the owners of which are unknown, shall be deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to the State.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(e) (1982).
Id § 279(a) (1982 & Supp. 1983).
"Contraband per se, of course, requires no proceeding for forfeiture." Director of
Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 607, 619, 465 A.2d 450, 457 (1983). Although subsection
297(e), by limiting itself to Schedule I drugs, implies that forfeitures of Schedule
II, Ill, IV, and V CDS require more than summary forfeiture, formal proceedings
are rarely followed to forfeit them. Once seized, CDS of any type is usually destroyed by the state.
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
Id § 297(a)(3).
Id § 297(a)(5).
They will, of course, object if the property will be used as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
Mo. R.P. 622, 623, Fl-F6, G40-G61 (1977 & Supp. 1983). For current versions,
see Mo. R.P. 2-115, 2-126(f), 2-621, 2-641, 2-642, 2-643, 2-645, 2-646.
MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1983).
Id § 297(a)(6).
Id § 297(a)(8).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In discussing the federal narcotics
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owner has an expectation of privacy, the question then becomes
whether a seizure warrant of some type is required to seize property for
forfeiture.
B.

The Fourth Amendment and Seizures
Forfeiture

of Property Subject to

The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.I29
Although the fourth amendment applies to seizures for forfeiture, 130 courts disagree as to the precise application of this constitutional provision. For example, courts are divided as to whether the
fourth amendment warrant requirement is applicable to forfeiture
seizures, whether an exception to that requirement excuses the failure
to obtain a warrant, and if a constitutional violation occurs, what sanctions a court may impose.IJI
The following discussion will demonstrate that the fourth amendment warrant requirement should apply to certain seizures for forfeiture, that the application of the exclusionary rule, originally created to
protect fourth amendment rights in criminal cases, 132 provides inadequate protection in forfeiture cases, and that denial of the forfeiture
may be an appropriate remedy when a fourth amendment violation
occurs.
1.

The Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court has stated that "searches [made] without prior
approval by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." 133 Thus, probable cause and a warrant are

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

forfeiture provision, the Fourth Circuit recently stated: "[t]he statute does not purport to authorize an intrusion on a 'legitimate expectation of privacy,' which is
now the focal point of Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Kemp,
690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV (emphasis supplied).
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696-98 (1965).
See i'!fra notes 167 & 185 and accompanying text.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). The Court has
recognized that a warrant is not required in certain circumstances. E.g., United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (mobile vehicle); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 554 (1980) (consent); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (emergency); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory of vehicle);
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required to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacyP4 A warrant will be excused, however, in situations
involving hot pursuit, 135 mobile vehicles, 136 destruction of evidence, 137
or other exigent circumstances.l3s
The application of the fourth amendment warrant requirement to
seizures of property subject to forfeiture has not been analyzed by
either the Supreme Court or Maryland's appellate courts. 139 Lower
federal courts, however, have grappled with this question. 140 Several
factors may explain why the question is seldom raised as to whether a
warrant or some exception to the warrant requirement is required to
seize forfeitable property. First, the statutes involved in forfeiture actions have not required a warrant and have in fact implied that none is
needed. 141 Second, most decisions have focused on the forfeiture
claim, determining whether the property was used illegally, 142 rather

134.

135.
136.
137.
138.

139.

140.
141.
142.

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit of arrestee); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973) (highly evanescent evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(search incident to lawful arrest); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)
(abandonment); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (abandonment). As to
the Court's preference for warrants, see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981) (search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant needed to arrest a suspect
in the house of a third person).
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (emergency); United States v. Gardner,
627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (exigent circumstances justify protective
search of residence when officers reasonably believe that dangerous persons are
within); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.) (report of unconscious
woman provided sufficient exigency for forcible entry without a search warrant),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). For a list of other search warrant exceptions, see
supra note 133.
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 n.14
(1974) ("We have no occasion to address the question whether the Fourth
Amendment warrant or probable cause requirements are applicable to seizures
under the Puerto Rican statutes"). The Puerto Rican statutes referred to by the
Court are identical for the purposes of this discussion to both the federal and
Maryland provisions. See21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982); Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297
(1982 & Supp. 1983).
E.g., United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); United
States v. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982).
See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (lith Cir.
1983); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
u.s. 907 (1976).
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than analyzing whether the warrantless seizure was proper. 143 Third,
most seizures have occurred contemporaneously with an arrest and a
patent violation of the CDS laws, thereby obviating the need for a
search warrant.
An explanation of the typical sequence of events giving rise to a
forfeiture proceeding may be helpful in understanding the decisions
discussing whether a warrant is required to seize property for forfeiture. Generally, the forfeitable property is in some manner used in violation of law. Depending upon the circumstances, the seizure of the
property can occur during or subsequent to the violation. For example,
the search of an automobile might reveal further evidence of a narcotics violation. Typically, a criminal prosecution of the owner of the
seized property will follow the seizure, although the prosecution is not
a prerequisite to forfeiture. During the pendency of the criminal trial,
the government will usually retain possession of the seized property for
use as evidence. Finally, the government will institute a forfeiture proceeding to establish its right to retain permanently the seized property.
Cases that have considered whether the fourth amendment requires a warrant for seizures of property for forfeiture can be divided
into two categories. The first category consists of criminal cases in
which the admission of evidence is challenged on the ground that it was
found as a result of an illegal forfeiture seizure. 144 The second group
consists of forfeiture cases in which the forfeiture itself is challenged on
the ground that the seizure was illegal. 145 While the second category
deals solely with a forfeiture question, the first category involves a classic search and seizure question, complicated somewhat by the involvement of a forfeiture seizure. The inconsistent results reached by the
courts may be attributable to their failure to understand the difference
between a search and seizure problem in a criminal case and a seizure
in a civil forfeiture case.
2.

The Warrant Requirement and Forfeiture Seizures: Challenges in
Criminal Cases to the Admission of Evidence Found as a
Result of a Warrantless Forfeiture Seizure

Most cases that discuss whether a forfeiture seizure must meet the
fourth amendment warrant requirements have involved challenges in
criminal cases to the admissibility of evidence found as a result of a
warrantless seizure for forfeiture. Typically, the defendant argues that
the failure to obtain a warrant prior to the forfeiture seizure violated
the fourth amendment and that evidence found as a result of the
seizure must be suppressed at the criminal trial. Most courts have held,
for various reasons, that a warrant is not required to seize property for
143. See, e.g., State v. One 1979 Pontiac Firebird, 55 Md. App. 394, 462 A.2d 73
(1983); Crowley v. State, 25 Md. App. 417, 334 A.2d 557 (1975).
144. See infra notes 146-89 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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forfeiture. 146 A minority of courts, however, have held that a warrant
or some exception to the warrant requirement is needed. 147
Courts have used several theories to support the conclusion that
the fourth amendment does not require a warrant to seize property for
forfeiture. The first theory relies on the concept that the government is
entitled to the property subject to the forfeiture from the moment of its
unlawful use. 148 This theory is derived from language in Boyd v.
United States, 149 an 1886 Supreme Court decision. The Boyd Court
stated:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment
thereof, are totally different things from a search for and
seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as
evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the
one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other, it is not. 150
The Court buttressed its position by indicating that the First Congress
passed both the customs statutes and the Bill of Rights. 151 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that the First Congress did not regard searches and
seizures of this kind as unreasonable, within the prohibition of the
fourth amendment.Js2
Subsequent lower court decisions have adopted this rationale, referred to as the automatic forfeiture rule. 15 3 Although this concept is
useful in dealing with claims of bona fide purchasers, it ignores the
146. E.g., United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One
1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); Francolino v. United States,
367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
147. E.g., United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1468-76 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Karp, 508 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1914),cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); United
States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitlock, 418
F. Supp. 138, 141-42 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd mem., 556 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1977).
148. The inception of the government's property right "occurs when the car is illegally
used. The physical repossession of the automobile may occur subsequently."
United States v. One 1952 Ford Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
149. 116 u.s. 616 (1886).
150. Id. at 623.
151. Id. In a recent decision the Court again used this reasoning to support its conclusion that another customs statute, 19 U.S.C. § 158l(a) (1976), authorized the suspicionless boarding of vessels by government officers. United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1983) (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623).
For a discussion of the Villamonte-Marquez decision, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Search and Seizure-19 U.S.C 158J(a). Random and Suspicionless Boarding
of Vessel by Customs Officers does not Violate the Fourth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 159 (1984).
152. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
153. See, e.g., United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir.
1958); United States v. One Pontiac LeMans, 470 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Mass. 1979),
ajjd, 621 F.2d 444 (lst Cir. 1980); Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn.
1972).
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fourth amendment right of the property's owner or possessor to be free
from unreasonable seizures. The fourth amendment "protects two
types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures'. . . .
A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 154 A
determination, without more, that the government has a superior interest in the property is insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the
seizure. The fourth amendment, which governs the manner of seizure,
must be satisfied. 155
Courts have adopted a second theory that recognizes a further exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement when seizures of
property for forfeiture are involved. In United States v. Francolino, 156
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
introduction in a criminal case of evidence found as a result of a search
of a vehicle seized for forfeiture without a warrant under 49 U.S.C.
§§ 781-84. 157 The Francolino court, relying on Boyd and Carroll v.
United States, 158 reasoned that Congress could, consistently with the
fourth amendment, create a further exception to the search warrant requirement for vehicles that have transported contraband. 159
The court's rationale in Francolino presents several problems.
First, the Second Circuit created a new exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, something which the Supreme Court has
not yet approved. 160 Second, reliance on Boyd is weak since the supportive language is dictum. 161 Third, Carroll dealt with the warrantless
search of a vehicle, not its warrantless seizure. The fourth amendment
interests implicated in searches and seizures differ: while searches interfere with privacy interests, 162 seizures interfere with possessory inter154. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984).
155. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). InJejfers, government officials
seized untaxed drugs after a warrantless search of a hotel room. The Court specifically rejected the argument that officials could search for and seize the drugs
because of their contraband nature, holding that the right to forfeit drugs did not
abrogate the fourth amendment. As to the idea that "forfeit is forfeit," no matter
how far prior to the seizure the unlawful use occurred, see the majority and dissenting opinions in the recent Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Kemp, 690
F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982). The majority specifically declined to discuss the fourth
amendment question: "We express no opinion on whether exigent circumstances
are necessary, or were present in the case at bar, to sustain this seizure pursuant to
[the federal statutes] under the Fourth Amendment." Id at 402. The Kemp court
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of this issue. See also
Jones v. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 466 A.2d 895 (1983) (following Kemp).
156. 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
157. 49 u.s.c. § 782 (1976).
158. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
159. Franco/ino, 367 F.2d at 1022.
160. Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
161. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court did not determine whether
warrantless seizure for forfeiture was unconstitutional).
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

104

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

ests. 163 The Carroll rationale clearly does not justify the often
permanent interference with a person's possessory interests, without
prior judicial approval, that results from a warrantless forfeiture
seizure. Fourth, the Franco/ino court's statement that "we cannot recall
too often that the Fourth Amendment bans only unreasonable searches
and seizures," 164 cannot be considered accurate in light of the language
in Katz v. United States . 165 The Katz Court remarked that "the most
basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches' conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." 166 A blanket forfeiture exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with
the mandate of Katz since many instances of seizures of property for
forfeiture are planned well in advance and while there is time to secure
a seizure warrant.
Despite these problems, Francolino remains the majority opinion
on warrantless seizures of property for forfeiture and has been followed
in a number of circuits. 167 As additional support for this position, other
courts have cited warrantless arrests of persons in public places 168 and
the inapplicability of fourth amendment warrant requirements to a
civil in rem forfeiture action. 169 Some courts have also attempted to
justify warrantless forfeiture seizures by reasoning that the fourth
amendment standards applicable to seizures are less stringent than
those applied to searches. 170 The Supreme Court has never directly
163. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984).
164. Franco/ino, 367 F.2d at 1022.
165. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), quoted with approval in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
166. Katz, 389 U.S. at 454-55; see supra notes 133-38.
167. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1975
Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444 (lst Cir. 1980); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d
717 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264
(lOth Cir. 1970); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 958 (1966); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963). In United States v. Pappas, 600 F.2d 300 (lst Cir.),
aJrd on rehearing, 613 F.2d 324 (lst Cir. 1979), the First Circuit followed the
Franco/ino approach. The latter Pappas opinion, however, can be interpreted as
supporting the McCormick rationale. ld (probable cause exception to seizure of
automobile, 21 U.S.C. 881 (1982), not applicable unless the seizure immediately
followed violations); see infra note 185 (discussing Pappas).
168. See United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981).
169. See United States v. One Thousand Fifty-Eight Dollars in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 1963).
170. Compare United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[w]e
start with the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to searches
and to seizures") with United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 367, 369 (3d Cir. 1981)
(finding a "distinction, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, between
searches and seizures"; court required less probable cause to support a forfeiture
seizure than a search) and United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.) (stan-
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resolved the question, although a reading of Cardwell v. Lewis 171 indicates that searches and seizures should be judged by the same criteria.
The first case to challenge the Franco/ino rule was United States v.
McCormick . 172 In McCormick, the Ninth Circuit held that the warrantless seizure for forfeiture of an automobile parked in the defendant's driveway violated the fourth amendment. Since the court
assumed that the fourth amendment applied equally to searches and
seizures, those seizures conducted without a warrant were per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, 173 subject only to certain exceptions such as exigent circumstances. 174 The McCormick court reasoned
that since Congress cannot authorize a search or seizure that violates
the fourth amendment, 175 absent a recognized exception a law enforcement official must first obtain a valid warrant before seizing a vehicle
under a forfeiture statute. 176
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland in
United States v. McMichae/ 177 recently followed McCormick. In McMichael, the court analyzed prior decisions and held that CDS found
during a search of a vehicle seized for forfeiture could not be introduced as evidence in McMichael's criminal trial since the warrantless
seizure of the automobile violated the fourth amendment. 178 Although
the vehicle had facilitated an earlier violation, it was not seized until
fifteen hours after McMichael's arrest. Furthermore, the vehicle was
not searched until two months after its seizure and the search was
based on information supplied by a co-defendant that CDS might be
found in the trunk. The search revealed tinfoil packets of cocaine. 179
The McMichael court first found that subsection 88l(b)(l) of the
federal statute, 180 which authorizes seizures for forfeiture made incident to a lawful arrest, did not support the seizure since it was not
made until long after the defendant's arrest. 181 Turning to subsection
(b)(4), the court acknowledged that it did not require a warrant, but
rather only probable cause. 182 Nevertheless, applying the McCormick
line of reasoning and rejecting Franco/ina, the court ruled that an "exigent circumstances" requirement must be read into the statute "to

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

dard of probable cause to suppport a seizure for forfeiture is less than that required to obtain a search warrant), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978).
417 u.s. 583 (1974).
502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 285; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
McCormick, 502 F.2d at 285; see supra note 133 and text accompanying notes 13538.
See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2575, 2578 (1983); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1974).
541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982).
Id. at 965.
Id. at 957-60.
21 u.s.c. 88l(b)(l) (1982).
McMichael, 541 F. Supp. at 960.
Id.
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avoid the serious constitutional question posed by a warrantless seizure
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 881(b)(4)." 183 Finding no exigent circumstances, the McMichael court ruled the seizure invalid. As a result,
the investigatory search that followed was also defective. 184
While a few courts have reached conclusions similar to McMichael, 185 a majority of courts have continued to uphold warrantless
seizures of property for forfeiture. 186 Most of these cases involve
automobiles. Because the mobile vehicle exception to the warrant requirement may excuse the necessity of obtaining a warrant, 187 many of
these cases would be similarly decided regardless of the position
adopted by the court. Problems arise, however, when the courts that
follow Francolino are faced with warrantless seizures of property that
do not involve an automobile or some clearly defined exception to the
warrant requirement.
When evidence is offered in a criminal case that has been found as
a result of a warrantless seizure of property for forfeiture, courts should
follow the McCormick rationale. Under McCormick, seizures of property for forfeiture require a warrant or exigent circumstances that trigger a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 188 Absent a
warrant or an exception, the exclusionary rule requires that evidence
obtained as a result of the seizure be excluded from the criminal
trial.1S9
183. /d at 964.
184. ld (citing United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
907 (1978).
185. United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1468-76 (9th Cir. 1983) (extending McCormick to narcotics forfeitures); United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1977) (suitcases found in automobile obtained by warrantless seizure inadmissible
at owner's trial); United States v. Thrower, 442 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (upholding warrantless seizure of automobile as exception to warrant requirement
because it was seized under exigent circumstances); State v. Manuel, 426 So. 2d
140, 146 (La. 1983) ("The warrant safeguard is equally applicable to seizure of an
automobile for the purposes of forfeiture, since the warrantless seizure of an automobile as contraband is subject to the same potential for abuse as the seizure of
articles for evidentiary purposes without prior judicial approval."). In United
States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 331 (lst Cir. 1979), the First Circuit held a warrantless seizure of an automobile a violation of the fourth amendment but nevertheless upheld the introduction into evidence in the criminal trial of a gun found
in the vehicle. The Pappas court relied upon Michigan v. DeFilipo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979), and noted that the exclusionary rule was an improper remedy when the
seizure was not in violation of any prior judicial construction.
186. See supra note 167 (listing cases).
187. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). But see United States v. Spetz, 771
F.2d 1457, 1470-73 (9th Cir. 1983) (automobile exception did not excuse warrantless seizure of vehicle when there was no probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband when seized, and when vehicle was parked two miles from
owner's residence).
188. United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
189. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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The Warrant Requirement and Forfeiture Seizures: Challenges
to the Forfeiture of Property Seized Without a Warrant
or an Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Although most courts have concluded otherwise, 190 the seizure of
property for forfeiture without a warrant or an exception violates the
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. When the seizure is
challenged in the criminal trial of the property's owner, the exclusionary rule provides adequate protection from fourth amendment violations by excluding any evidence found as a result of the illegal seizure.
As explained below, however, the application of the exclusionary rule
to a forfeiture proceeding itself does not protect against unconstitutional seizures; dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding is the appropriate
remedy.
When a claimant in a forfeiture proceeding challenges the warrantless seizure of property for forfeiture, courts have almost unanimously rejected the argument that a seizure made in violation of the
fourth amendment requires the dismissal of the forfeiture action. 191
Courts reach this conclusion because of the manner in which they apply the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases. The rule that excludes improperly seized evidence is effective in criminal cases since the
defendant is objecting to the admissibility of the evidence against him,
not the seizure or deprivation itself. Excluding the illegally seized evidence cures the constitutional violation by nullifying the reason for
which the evidence was seized, that is, to be used against the defendant
in a criminal proceeding. In forfeiture cases, however, the purpose of
the seizure is not to generate evidence against the property owner, but
rather to take the property away from him. 192
In forfeiture cases, the exclusionary rule, as in criminal cases, bars
evidence that has been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
The evidence that supports a forfeiture, however, rarely comes from the
seizure itself. 193 Instead, the evidence of criminal use usually derives
190. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1975
Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d
717 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264
(lOth Cir. 1970); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (lOth Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963).
191. E.g., United States v. One 1977 Mercedes-Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F.2d 293, 297
(8th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d
351, 352 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Director of Fin. v. Cole, 296 Md. 60't, 630
n.6, 465 A.2d 450, 463 n.6 (1983); see generally Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 473 (1966 &
Supp. 1983) (collecting cases).
192. Of course, the seizure or a search of seized property could nevertheless generate
·
evidence of the owner's criminal conduct.
193. An exception is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).

108

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

from observations and admissions made prior to the seizure, such as
when an automobile is seized because the defendant sold drugs from it
on prior occasions. The evidence of illegal use, therefore, is independent of the seizure. The application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture
cases can result in the anomalous situation where the seizure itself may
be constitutionally defective yet still be upheld because the evidence to
support the forfeiture was constitutionally obtained. 194
The application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases, therefore, does not protect citizens from unconstitutional seizures of their
property. The fourth amendment forbids unreasonable s~arches and
seizures. The disparity in treatment occasioned by the application of
the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases is nowhere justified in the Constitution. Indeed, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 195 the Supreme Court,
in discussing administrative searches, specifically recognized that "[i]t
is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior." 196
It is clear, therefore, that seizures of property intended for forfeiture should be treated the same as seizures of property intended as evidence in criminal cases. Since the exclusionary rule is an ineffective
guardian of constitutional rights in forfeiture proceedings, courts dealing with forfeitures involving unconstitutional seizures of property
should consider dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings as an appropriate remedy. A few courts have taken this position. 197
For example, in Berkowitz v. United States, 198 the court dismissed
a forfeiture of currency as improper because the money had been

194.

195.
196.
197.

198.

In that case, illegal liquor was found as a result of an illegal seizure. Since the
evidence was excluded, the forfeiture failed.
E.g., United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980);
United States v. One 1971 Harley Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351, 352 (9th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586,
588 (9th Cir. 1969); lnterbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34, 39 (lst Cir. 1962).
387 u.s. 523 (1967).
Id at 530 (footnote omitted).
Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (lst Cir. 1965); United States v. ThirtyEight Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars in United States Currency,
498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (dismissing forfeiture), mod!fted sub nom.
United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1981) (seizure held legal; consequently no need to bar forfeiture), on remand, 541 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(underlying search illegal; forfeiture again dismissed), rev'd, 706 F.2d 806 (7th
Cir. 1983) (forfeiture proceeded since search upheld); Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F.
Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973); In re
1972 Porsche, 307 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See generally Note,
Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Illegal Seizure of Derivative Contraband
Bars Foifeiture, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 724 (1982) (advocating dismissal of forfeiture).
A trial judge should also consider dismissal of a forfeiture as an appropriate remedy for due process violations. See supra note 4.
340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965).
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seized in violation of the owner's constitutional rights. 199 In Melendez
v. Shultz, 2 oo a three judge federal district court panel held that the
seizure by federal agents of an automobile in local police custody violated the fourth amendment. Specifically, the Melendez court reasoned
that if a violation results in the suppression of evidence it should also
result in the defeat of the forfeiture, stating that "[t]he initial seizure
being unconstitutional, it would be 'attaching too· great a premium'
upon such conduct to permit the government now to retain the
vehicle. " 20 1
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful conduct
and to preserve respect for government and judicial integrity, 202 these
purposes are more effectively fulfilled by a rule that not only excludes
illegally obtained evidence from use in a forfeiture proceeding but also
bars the forfeiture itself. 203 Absent this rule, there is little to deter police officers from improperly seizing property for forfeiture, something
they cannot do in criminal cases without the scrunity of a neutral and
detached magistrate. Whether the property is seized as evidence in a
criminal case or for forfeiture, the deprivation suffered by the property
owner is the same. The Melendez court acknowledged this point in
discussing the seizure of an automobile: "the right of the automobile
owner not to have it searched is no more worthy of protection than his
right not to have it seized without legal procedure." 204 A rule barring
the forfeiture of illegally seized property would have far less impact on
the administration of justice than the exclusion of evidence in a criminal case.
Procedure for Seizing Property Subject to Forfeiture
Having analyzed the fourth amendment considerations in relation
to seizures of property for forfeiture, the following discussion will examine the procedures that govern seizure of property involved in CDS
violations, with an emphasis on whether the statutory procedures are
adequate in light of the fourth amendment warrant requirement. The
C

199. /d. at 173. But see United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450
(1st Cir. 1980) (court questioned the Berkowitz rationale) (dictum).
200. 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973).
201. Melendez, 356 F. Supp. at 1210 (quoting Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168,
174 (1st Cir. 1965)).
202. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 466
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). But if. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-44 (1984) (White,
J., concurring) (questioning deterrent effect of exclusionary rule when law enforcement officers act in the reasonable belief that a search and seizure was consistent with the fourth amendment).
203. See United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1950) (barring
forfeiture); if. State v. One 1980 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 55 Md. App. 178,
185, 469 A.2d 487, 491 (1984) (dismissing forfeiture for failure to comply with
statutory time constraints in Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297 (1982)).
204. Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 486
F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973).
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controlling Maryland provision, article 27, subsection 297(b), provides
in part:

Seizure ofproperty subject to foifeiture .- Any property subject to forfeiture under this subheading may be seized upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property except that seizure without such process may be made
when---(i) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search
under a search warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; (ii) The property subject to seizure
has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the State
in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this
subheading; (iii) There is probable cause to believe that the
property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety;
or (iv) There is probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or is intended to be used in violation of this
subheading. 205
Subsection 297(b), which closely parallels the language in the comparable federal provision, 206 indicates that in the absence of the four
enumerated exceptions, a court must issue some type of "process"
before property may be seized for forfeiture. 207 The statute, however,
provides no guidelines as to what criteria a court should consider in
issuing this process, although probable cause to believe the property
has been or is intended to be used illegally should undoubtedly be the
test.zos
205. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b) (Supp. 1983).
206. 21 u.s.c. § 88l(b) (1982).
207. Exactly what "process" is required by the statute, however, is unclear. Process in
relation to seizures of property is a recognized concept in admiralty law. The
rules governing admiralty seizures provide for the issuance of a seizure warrant on
the basis of a verified complaint, affidavit, and description of the property to be
seized. 28 U.S.C. App. SUPP. ADM. & MARITIME R. B(l), C(l), C(2). Maryland
law, however, lacks a procedural analogue. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b) (1982)
("upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims") with Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b) (Supp. 1983)
("upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property"). Maryland procedural rules define process as "any written order issued by a court to
secure compliance with its commands, or to require action by any person, including but not limited to a summons at law or in equity, an order of publication, a
commission, a writ and an order of any kind." Mo. R.P. 5, § y (1977) (current
version at Mo. R.P. l-202(s)); see also id § ff (defining writ) (current version at
Mo. R.P. l-202(y)).
208. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a) (Supp. 1983) (forfeiture of each category of
property requires evidence of some type of illegal use). This should be the test
even though subsection 297(b) states that the existence of probable cause constitutes an exception to the "process" requirement. q: United States v. McMichael,
541 F. Supp. 956, 964 (D. Md. 1982) (imposing an exigent circumstances requirement on analogous federal statute to remedy constitutional infirmity of statute).
The statutory exception, of course, does not dispense with the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. q: United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.
Ct. 2573, 2578 (1983) ("no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Con-
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Subsection 297(b) sets forth four exceptions to the process requirement.209 The second exception merits little discussion since a prior
judgment for forfeiture means that a judge has already ruled that the
property was used in violation of law and should be forfeited. Thus,
this exception satisfies the fourth amendment preference for review by
a neutral and detached magistrate. The manner of seizure, however,
may remain a problem. Although a court has already rendered a judgment for forfeiture, a seizure warrant may still be necessary to seize
property for forfeiture. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated
that an arrest warrant is insufficient by itself to seize a person in another person's home. 210 A search warrant for that home is also required. Applying this principle to forfeitures, it becomes apparent that
a search warrant in addition to the judgment for forfeiture may be required to seize property located in another person's home or in an area
where a third person has an expectation ofprivacy. 211 The third exception, which applies when the property is dangerous to health or safety,
poses few constitutional problems. If any CDS situation merits a
seizure without a warrant, the emergency search exception to the warrant requirement will probably sustain such a seizure. 212
The first and the fourth exceptions enumerated in subsection
297(b) are most frequently used as the basis for seizing property subject
to forfeiture in narcotics cases. 213 Specifically, seizures incident to an

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

stitution") (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
A recent Fourth Circuit decision contains a useful discussion of whether probable
cause can become stale in forfeiture cases. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397
(4th Cir. 1982). The Kemp court held that the probable cause requirement of 21
U.S.C. § 88l(b)(4) does not require that the seizure be contemporaneous with the
events giving rise to probable cause "if the property seized allegedly 'has been
used' in violation of the drug laws." The court implied that probable cause in this
situation could never become stale. Id at 400. The Kemp court expressed reservations about situations where probable cause existed to believe the property was
"intended" to be used unlawfully since "if the property is not so used, that would
belie the original belief." Id at 401 n.4.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently followed the Kemp
court's reasoning, and held that the passage of time between the criminal conduct
and a seizure was irrelevant to a determination of probable cause under article 27,
§ 297, since the statute only required a showing that the property "has been used"
in violation of CDS laws. Jones v. State, 56 Md. App. 101, 115, 466 A.2d 895, 903
(1983). The Jones court, however, acknowledged that delays in seizure could create due process problems. Id. at 117, 466 A.2d at 903. The court determined that
the three month delay did not violate due process, and noted that a case-by-case
analysis would be used in evaluating due process claims. Id at 117-18, 466 A.2d
at 903.
MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(b)(l) (Supp. 1983) (reproduced supra text at note
205).
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
See United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982).
See United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980); Wayne v.
United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
E.g., Geppi v. State, 270 Md. 239, 310 A.2d 768 (1973) (seizure based upon probable cause); Office of Fin. v. Jones, 46 Md. App. 419, 417 A.2d 470 (seizure of
currency based upon probable cause), cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 (1980).
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arrest and seizures made on probable cause to believe the property has
been or is intended to be used unlawfully raise troublesome issues.
1.

Seizures Made Incident to Arrest

This exception to the subsection 297(b) requirements provides that
no process is necessary where the seizure for forfeiture is made "incident to an arrest." Thus, since no warrant is required, a police officer
may arrest a person for possessing or selling CDS and seize any property that has become subject to forfeiture as a result of that offense.
Many arrests, however, are made long after the commission of the
offense giving rise to the forfeiture. 214 For example, during a conspiracy investigation, arrests may be postponed while law enforcement officers gather additional evidence. When a conspirator is subsequently
arrested in a vehicle that has been used previously to transport CDS, a
question arises as to whether the arrest of the conspirator provides the
basis for a simultaneous seizure of property that, by virtue of an earlier
offense, had become subject to forfeiture. Subsection 297(b)(l)(i) implies that the arrest, in these circumstances, provides a basis for seizure.
Examination of this common arrest situation, however, suggests that a
warrant may be required.
Most courts uphold the seizure of property subject to forfeiture as
long as the seizure is made contemporaneously with an arrest. Despite
this tendency, danger exists in relying on the language of subsection
297(b). The phrase "incident to arrest" has a peculiar meaning in the
law of search and seizure. In Chime/ v. Cal(fornia, 215 the Supreme
Court allowed an exception to the warrant requirement for searches
incident to arrest because of the need to protect the officer's safety and
to prevent the destruction of evidence. 216 It is difficult to perceive how
this rationale justifies the warrantless seizure of forfeitable property
merely because of the contemporaneous arrest of its owner or possessor. A court may therefore invalidate a seizure in this situation where
the officer had time to obtain a warrant in advance. The court could
easily distinguish a situation where an arrest and the grounds for
seizure arise simultaneously from the situation where the arrest of a
person and the seizure of his property was planned and was not the
immediate result of a crime committed in the officer's presence. In
sum, there is an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment in the first example because of the exigent circumstances,
but no exception in the second situation because the officer had suffi214. For example, in United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974), the
illegal use of the vehicle seized occurred prior to the owner's arrest. The vehicle
was parked in the owner's driveway at the time the agents arrested the owner in
his house.
215. 395 u.s. 752 (1969).
216. Id at 764.
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cient time to obtain a warrant.2• 7
2.

Seizures Made Upon Probable Cause

Failing to find support in the incident to arrest exception to the
process requirements of subsection 297(b), 218 an officer seizing property
that is subject to forfeiture because of an earlier offense may still be
able to rely on the fourth exception in subsection 297(b)(l). The fourth
exception authorizes the warrantless seizure of property subject to forfeiture when there is probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or was intended to be used unlawfully. 219 A literal reading
of this exception would swallow the entire provision. Obviously the
statutory drafters did not intend this result, and at least one federal
court has been reluctant to give such an expansive interpretation to the
federal counterpart of the Maryland statute.22o
Maryland courts, though, have had few problems with this provision. Despite the statement by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Gatewood v. State 221 that "[i]t would serve no purpose to repeat the
careful explication of the constitutional problems inherent in forfeiture
statutes made for the Court by Judge Digges in [Prince George's County
v.] Blue Bird [Cab Co.)," 222 the question of whether a warrant or some
exception to the warrant requirement is constitutionally necessary to
seize property for forfeiture has never been extensively discussed by the
Maryland courts. For example, in Geppi v. State, 223 the court of appeals decided whether the currency seized for forfeiture from the appellant was pursuant to the "incident to arrest" or the "probable cause"
provisions of subsection 297(b). 224 Although it concluded that the
seizure was not made incident to the appellant's arrest and thus sustainable under the first exception in subsection (b), the Geppi court found
that the forfeiture proceeding was based on the fourth exception. The
court indicated that there was probable cause to believe that the property had been used or was intended to be used in violation of Maryland
law. 225 The question of whether this was sufficient under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments was never discussed.
217. See United States v. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Md. 1982) (warrantless seizure of automobile violated fourth amendment when there was ·~ust no
good reason why the DEA agents could not ... have sought to obtain a warrant
from a judicial officer").
218. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b)(l)(i) (Supp. 1983).
219. /d. § 297(b)(l)(iv).
220. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova, 560 F.2d 464, 469-70 (lst Cir. 1977)
(construing 28 U.S.C. § 881).
221. 268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973).
222. /d. at 353, 301 A.2d at 500.
223. 270 Md. 239, 244, 310 A.2d 768, 771 (1973).
224. Subsections 297(b)(l) and (b)(4) of the former Maryland statute at issue in Geppi,
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 297(b)(l), (4) (1971), correspond to the current provisions for arrest and probable cause, id. §§ 297(b)(l)(i) and (iv) (Supp. 1983).
225. Geppi, 270 Md. at 245, 310 A.2d at 771.
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The sole Maryland appellate case to directly analyze this question
is Crowley v. State, 226 a 1975 decision by the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland. In Crowley, a county deputy sheriff acting under a search
warrant stopped and searched a vehicle and found a brick of marijuana
on the floor of the back seat. The driver and the vehicle's occupants
were then arrested and the vehicle impounded. A week later, acting
without a warrant, the police again searched the vehicle and found 240
LSD tablets. 227 Referring to the second search of the vehicle, the Crowley court recognized the inapplicability of a number of legal theories
that normally legitimize searches of property:
This search was not made under the authority of the search
warrant which had been executed and returned. It was not
made incident to an arrest, nor because of exigent circumstances. It was not made to take an inventory, nor to protect
any personal property which may have been in the vehicle. 2 2s
Thus far, the court of special appeals had followed the same reasoning
as the federal district court in United States v. McMichae/,2 29 an almost
identical case. The similarities, however, stopped at that point. The
court of special appeals found the search legal, basing its decision on
subsections 297(a)(l) and (4), 230 the categories making CDS and conveyances forfeitable, and subsection 297(f), 231 which sets forth the standards for forfeiting motor vehicles. The court did not base its holding
upon subsection 297(b), 232 which governs the manner of seizure. The
Crowley court relied upon the Supreme Court's language in Cooper v.
Cal[(ornia 233 that: "we cannot hold unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment the examination or search of a car validly held by officers
for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding." 234
The problem with the Cooper language is that the validity of the
automobile's seizure in Cooper was never in question; rather, the issue
before the Supreme Court was whether the vehicle could be
searched. 235 To cite Cooper for anything other than this is to extract
more from the case than was decided.
Therefore, Maryland appellate courts have never directly analyzed
the statutory bases for the seizure of property subject to forfeiture. The
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

25 Md. App. 417, 334 A.2d 557 (1975).
ld at 426, 334 A.2d at 562-63.
ld
541 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1982).
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(l), (4) (1971) (current provisions at id (Supp.
1983)).
ld § 297(f) (current provision at id (Supp. 1983)).
ld § 297(b) (current provision at id (Supp. 1983)).
386 u.s. 58 (1976).
Crowley v. State, 25 Md. App. 417, 426-27, 334 A.2d 557, 563 (1975) (quoting
Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62).
Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61.
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discussion above as to the federal cases dealing with this question 236
demonstrates the inadequacy of the procedures in subsection 297(b).
The exceptions in subsections 297(b)(l)(i) and (iv) are so broad that in
a practical sense they eliminate the requirement that process be obtained. In effect, subsection 297(b)(l), and in particular the first and
fourth exceptions, gives Maryland law enforcement officers unlimited
authority to seize property for forfeiture as long as they have probable
cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be
used in violation of the CDS laws, regardless of whether the seizure is a
result of exigent circumstances or is a seizure planned well in advance.
V.

CONCLUSION
The 1982 amendments to section 297 have greatly expanded the
types of property that can be seized and forfeited to the state in narcotics cases. Since the number of seizures is likely to increase as a result of
these amendments, courts will scrutinize the manner in which such
seizures are made. Property now covered by subsections 297(a)(6) and
(8) will generate more contested cases since claimants will argue that
these assets, unlike contraband per se, were seized unjustly. The rule
prevalent in most federal courts that no prior judicial approval is required before seizing property for forfeitures will likewise be tested.
Cases in which automobiles are seized contemporaneously with an offender's arrest will be replaced by more troublesome cases in which
assets such as currency, stocks and bonds, and other personal property
will be seized independently of other law enforcement events. If
seizures occur when the officer had time to obtain prior judicial approval, courts may find that fourth amendment requirements overcome
the warrantless probable cause provision of subsection 297(b)(l)(iv)
and require that a warrant be obtained to seize the property. Such a
rule, requiring probable cause and a warrant or some exception to the
warrant requirement, would bring constitutional rules to an area of the
law that has stood to one side as the rules surrounding the search of a
citizen's property have undergone extensive development. Application
of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture cases has failed to provide the
constitutional protection this rule has given defendants in criminal
cases. The actual seizure, as opposed to the evidence supporting the
forfeiture, should be subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment and, to ensure the effectiveness of the enforcement of this
rule, the penalty for the unconstitutional seizure of property should be
the dismissal of the forfeiture action itself.

236. See supra notes 129-204 and accompanying text.

